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MINTON tI. CAVANEY

[L. A. No. 25881. In Bank.

[56C.2d

Sept. 6,196L]

WILLIAM MINTON et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.
. MAUDE N. CAV ANEY, as Executrix, etc., Defendant
and Appellant.[1] Corporations-Disregard of Corporate Entity-Alter Ego of
Individuals.-The figurative tenninology "alter ego" and "disregard of the corporate entity" is generally used to refer to the
various situations that are an abuse of the corporate privilege.
[2] Id. - Disregard of Corporate Entity - When Power Will Be
ExerciBed.-The equitable owners of a corporation are perSOllally liable when they treat the assets of the corporation as
their own and add or withdraw capital from the corporation
at will, when they hold themselves out as being personally
liable for debts of the corporation, or when they provide inadequate capitalization and actively participate in the conduct of
corporate affairs.
[3] leL-DiBregard of Corporate Entity-Evidence.-Evidence that
an individual who was not only the secretary and treasurer
of a corporation but also a director was to receive a third of
the shares supported an inference that he was an equitable
owner, and evidence that for a time the records of the corporation were kept in his offie.e supported an inference that he
actively participated in the conduct of the business. The trial
court was not required to believe his statement that he was
only a "temporary" director and officer "for accommodation" j
in any event it merely raised a conflict in the evidence that
was resolved adversely to defendant (executrix of his will).
[4] IeL-Officers-Liability.-A person may not divorce the responsibility of a director of a corporation from the statutory duties
and powers of that office by accepting the office as an "accommodation" with the understanding that he would not exercise
any of the duties of a director.

[1] Disregarding corporate existence, notes, 1 A.L.R. 610; 34
A.L.R. 597. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 8; Am.Jur., Corporations, § 4.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Corporations, §§ 5(1), 5(4); [2, 5]
Corporations, § 6(1); [3] Corporations, § 8(5); [4] Corporations,
§ 686; [6] Abatement, § 42; [7] Judgments, § 418; [8] Limitation
of Actions, §§ 136, 140; [9] Judgments, §§ 418, 424; [10] Judgments, § 424.
"Reporter'. Note: This ease was previousl1 entitled,
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[6] Id. - Disregard of Corporate Entity - When Power Will Be
Exercised.-The "alter ego" doctrine is not restricted to contractual debts, but may apply to tort claims.
[6] Abatement - Death of Party. - In an action to hold an individual personally liable on a judgment against a corporation
in a prior wrongful death action, plaintiffs' cause of action
did not abate when the individual died.
[7] Judgments-Res Judicata-Parties or Persons Bound.-In an
action to hold an individual personally liable on a judgment
against a corporation in a prior wrongful death action in which
the individual was not a party, the judgment in the action
against the corporation did not bar plaintiffs from bringing
the present action.

)

[8] Limitation of Actions-Pleading-Failure to Plead as Waiver:
Demurrer.-In an action to hold an individual personally liable
on a judgment against a corporation in n prior wrongful death
action, such individual waived the defense of the statute of
limitations by failing to plead that defense in the answer to
the complaint or speeifying the statute as a ground of general
demurrer.
[9] Judgments-Res Judicata-Parties or Persons Bound.-In an
action to hold an individual personally liable on a judgment
against a corporation in a prior wrongful death action, the
individual or his estate could not be held liable for the debts
of the corporation without opportunity to relitigate the issues
of the corporation's negligence or amount of damages sustained
where the individual was not a party to the action against the
corporation and the judgment in the prior action was therefore
not binding on him unless he controlled the litigation leading
to the judgment. The filing of an answer to the complaint
against the corporation as its then lawyer without :my other
participation wm; not sl1ffi('ient to hind him.
[10] Id.-Res Judicata-Parties or Persons Bound.-In order that
the rule that a person in control of litigation is bound by the
judgment should control, it is necessary that the one in whose
favor or against whom the rules of res judicata operate participate in the control of the action and if judgment is adverse,
be able to determine whether or not an appeal should be taken.
It is not sufficient that he supplies the funds for the prosecution or defense, that he appears as a witness or cooperates
without having control.
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, §§ 237,243; Am.Jur.,
Limitation of Actions, §§ 405, 410, 442.
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 262 et seq.
56 C.2d-lll

578

MINTON V. CAVANEY

[56 C.2d

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Frederick F. Houser, Judge. Reversed.
Action to hold an individual personally liable on a judgment
against a corporation in a prior wrongful death action. Judgment for plaintiffs reversed.
William E. McIntyre for Defendant and Appellant.
William M. Cavaney, in pro. per., as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Charles H. Manaugh, Michael K. Lanning and Sidney L.
Gelber for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-The Seminole Hot Springs Corporation,
hereinafter referred to as Seminole, was duly incorporated in
California on March 8,1954. It conducted a public swimming
pool that it leased from its owner. On June 24, 1954, plaintiffs t daughter drowned in the pool, and plaintiffs recovered
a judgment for $10,000 against Seminole for her wrongful
death. The judgment remains unsatis1ied.
·On January 30, 1957, plaintiffs brought the present action
to hold defendant Cavaney personally liable for the judgment
against Seminole. Cavaney died on May 28, 1958, and his
widow, the executrix of his estate, was substituted as defendant. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs for
$10,000. Defendant appeals.
Plaintiffs introduced evidence that Cavaney was a director
and secretary and treasurer of Seminole and that on November
15, 1954, about five months after the drowning, Cavaney as
secretary of Seminole and Edwin A. Kraft as president of
Seminole applied for permission to issue three shares of
Seminole stock, one share to be issued to Kraft, another to
F. J. Wettrick and the third to Cavaney. The Commissioner
of Corporations refused permission to issue these shares unless
additional information was furnished. The application was
then abandoned and no shares were ever issued. There was
also evidence that for a time Seminole used Cavaney's office
to keep records and to receive mail. Before his death Cavaney
answered certain interrogatories. He was asked if Seminole
"ever had any assets'" He stated that "insofar as my own
personal knowledge and belief is concerned said corporation
did not have any assets." Cavaney also stated in the return
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to an attempted execution that" [I]nsofar as I know, this
corporation had no assets of any kind or character. The corporation was duly organized but never functioned as a
corporation.' ,
Defendant introduced evidence that Cavaney was an attorney at law, that he was approached by Kraft and Wettrick
to form Seminole, and that he was the attorney for Seminole.
Plaintiffs introduced Cavaney's answer to several interrogatories that he held the post of secretary and treasurer and
director in a temporary capacity and as an accommodation
to his client.
Defendant contends that the evidence does not support the
court's determination l that Cavaney is personally liable for
Seminole's debts and that the "alter ego" doctrine is inapplicable because plaintiffs failed to show that there was" '(1) ...
such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer
exist and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of thc
corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow.'"
(Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal.2d 574, 580 [335 P.2d 107];
.ilutomotriz etc. De Oalifornia v. Resnick, 47 Ca1.2d 792, 796
[306 P.2d 1, 63 A.L.R.2d 1042] ; Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal.
481,487 [202 P. 673].)
[1] The figurative terminology "alter ego" and "disregard of the corporate entity" is generally used to refer to
the various situations that are an abuse of the corporate
privilege. (Ballantine, Corporations (rev. ed. 1946) § 122,
pp. 292-293; Lattin, Corporations, p. 66; Latty, The Oorporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 Mich.L.Rev.
597 (1936).) [2 ] The equitable owners of a corporation,
for example, are personally liable when they treat the assets
of the corporation as their own and add or withdraw capital
from the corporation at will (see Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal.
2d 574, 577-581 [335 P.2d 107] ; Thomson v. L. O. Roney &
00., 112 Cal.App.2d 420, 429 [246 P.2d 1017]) ; when they
hold themselves out as being personally liable for the debts
of the corporation (Stark v. Ooker, 20 Ca1.2d 839, 847 [129
P.2d 390]) ; or when they provide inadequate capitalization
and actively participate in the conduct of corporate affairs.
'Defendant did not request that the findings of the trial court be in·
eluded in the record on appeal. It must be presumed therefore that the
findings support t.he judgment. (See 3 Witkin, California Procedure,
pp.2238-2239.)
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(Attiomotriz etc. De California v. Resnick, supra, 47 Ca1.2el
792, 796, 797; Riddle v. Leu,schner, supra, 51 CaUd at, 580;
Stark v. Coker,20 Ca1.2d 839, 846-849 [129 P.2d 390] ; Sh.afford v. Otto Sales Co. Inc., 149 Cal.App.2d 428, 432 r308 P.2d
428] ; see Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal.App.2d 482, 492-493
{197 P.2d 167]; Ballantine, Corporations (rev. ed. 1946)
§ 129, pp. 302-303; Lattin, Corporations, pp. 68-72; Fuller,
The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1373, 1381-1383.)
In the instant case the evidence is undisputed that there
was no attempt to provide adequate capitalization. Seminole
never had any substantial assets. It leased the pool that it
operated, and the lease was forfeited for failure to pay the
rent. Its capital was" 'trifling compared with the business
to be done and the risks of loss. . . . '" (Automotriz etc. Dc
California v. Resnick, supra, 47 Ca1.2d 792, 797.) [3] Thc
evidence is also undisputed that Cavaney was not only thc
secretary and treasurer of the corporation but was also a
director. The evidence that Cavaney was to receive one-third
of the shares to be issued supports an inference that he was
an equitable owner (see Riddle v. Leuschner, supra, 51 Cal.2d
574, 580), and th,e evidence that for a time the records of
the corporation were kept in Cavaney's office supports an
inference that he actively participated in the conduct of the business. The trial court was not required to believe his statement that he was only a co temporary" director and officer
cc for accommodation." In any event it merely raised a conflict
in the evidence that was resolved adversely to defendant. Moreover, section 800 of the Corporations Code provides that
". . • the business and affairs of every corporation shall bc
controlled by, a board of not less than three directors." Defendant does not claim that Cavaney was a director with
specialized duties (see 5 U.Chi.L.Rev. 668). [4] It is immaterial whether or not he accepted the office of director
as an "accommodation" with the understanding that he
would not exercise any of the duties of a director. A person
may not in this manner divorce the responsibilities of a director from the statutory duties and powers of that office.
[5-7] There is no merit in defendant's contentions that
the cc alter ego" doctrine applies only to contractual debts
and not to tort claims (Mirabito v. San Francisco Dairy Co.,
1 Ca1.2d 400, 406 [35 P.2d 513] ; see Ballantine, Corporations
(rev. ed. 1946) § 127, p. 298) j that plaintiffs' cause of action
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ahatl'£1 Wll('ll Cavall~Y died (Civ. Codl", § 956; see Damiano v.
B1I11ting, 40 Cal.App. 566, 567 [181 P. 232]), or that the
judgment in the action against the corporation bars plaintiffs
from bringing the present action. (Dillard v. McKnight, 34
Ca1.2d 209, 214 [209 P.2d 387,11 A.L.R.2d 835].) [8] Defendant Cavaney waived the defense of the statute of limitations by failing to plead that defense in the answer to the
('omplaint or by specifying the statute of limitations as a
ground of its general demurrer. (Union 8uga.r 00. v. Hollister
Estate 00., 3 Ca1.2d 740, 741-745 [47 P.2d 273]; Miller v.
Pa"'ker, 128 Cal.App. 775, 776 [18 P.2d 89]; see Burke v.
1IIagui,'c, 154 Cal. 456, 462 [98 P. 21] ; 2 Witkin, California
Procedure, §§ 489, 545, pp. 1476-1477, 1541; 31 Cal.Jur.2d,
Limitations of Actions, § 243, p. 659.)
[9] In this action to hold defendant personally liable
upon the judgment against Seminole plaintiffs did not allege
or present any evidence on the issue of Seminole's negligence
or on the amount of damages sustained by plaintiffs. They
relied sole]y on the judgment against Seminole. Defendant
correctly contends that Cavaney or his estate cannot be held
liable for the debts of Seminole without an opportunity to
relitigate these issues. (Motores De Mexicali v. 811,perior Oourt,
51 Cal.2d 172, 176 [331 P.2d 1] ; see also Dillard v. McKnight,
supra, 34 Ca1.2d 209, 214.) Cavaney was not a party to the
action against the corporation, and the judgment in that
action is therefore not binding upon him unless he controlled
the litigation leading to the judgment. (Motores De Mexicali v.
Superior Oou,·t, supra, 51 Cal.2d 172, 175; Thomson v. L. O.
Roney"" 00., supra, 112 Cal.App.2d 420, 427; Mirabito v. 8an
Francisco Daif'Y 00.,8 Ca1.App.2d 54, 58-59 [47 P.2d 530] ; see
Rest., Judgments, § 84.) Although Cavaney filed an answer
to the complaint against Seminole as its attorney, he withdrew before the trial and did not thereafter participate
therein. The filing of an answer without any other participation is not sufficient to bind Cavaney. [10] "In order that
tlle rule stated in this section [that a person in control of the
litigation is bound by the judgment] should apply it is necessary th&t the one in whose favor or against whom the rules
of res judicata operate participate ill the control of the action
and if judgment is adverse, be able to determine whether or
not an appeal should be taken. It is not sufficient that he
supplies the funds for the prosecution or defense, that he
appears as a witness or cooperates without having control."
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(Rest., Judgments, § 84, comment e; see Moim'cs Dc Mexicali v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 172, 176.)
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con.eurred.
SCHAUER, J., CQncurring and Dissenting.-I concur in
the judgment of reversal on the ground that (as stated in the
majority opinion, ante, p. 581) "In this action to hold
defendant personally liable upon the jUdgment against
Seminole plaintiffs did not allege or present any evidence on
the issue of Seminole's negligence or on the amount of damages sustained by plaintiffs. They relied solely on the judgment against Seminole. Defendant correctly contends that
Cavauey or his estate cannot be held liable for the debts of
Seminole witbout an opportunity to relitigate these issues.
[Citations.] Cavaney was not a party to the action against
the corporation, and the judgment in that action is therefore
not binding upon him .... "
I dissent from any implication that mere professional activity by an attorney at law, as such, in the organization of a
corporation, can constitute any basis for a finding that the
corporation is the attorney's alter ego or that he is otherwise
personally liable for its debts, whether based on contract or
tort. That in such circumstances an attorney does not incur
any personal liability for debts of the corporation remains
true whether or not the attorney's professional services include
the issuance to him of a qualifying share of stock, the attendance at and participation in an organization meeting or meetings, the holding and exercise for such preliminary purposes,
in the course of his professional services, of an office or offices,
whether secretary or treasurer or presiding officer or any
combination of offices in the corporation.
The acts and services performed in organizing a corporation
do not constitute the carrying on of business by a corporation.
In this respect a corporation cannot properly be regarded as
organized and ready to even begin carrying on business until
at least qualifying shares of stock have been issued, a stockholders' meeting held, by-laws adopted and directors and
officers elected. Furthermore, a permit from the Commissioner
of Corporations must have been secured and minimum requirements of that agency met before the corporation can secure
assets for which its stock may issue (possibly to be impounded

!

I

Sept. 1961]

LUCAS

v.

HAMM

583

[56 C.2d 183; 15 Cal.Rptr. 821. 364 P.2d 885]

on conditions) and without which it cannot (at least normally) commence business. The scope of a lawYer's services in
corporate organization may often include advice and direction
as to the legal architecture of financial structures but does not,
as such, encompass responsibility for securing assets.
In the process of developing an idea of a person or persons
into an embryonic corporation and finally to full legal entity
status with a permit issued, directors and officers elected,
and assets in hand ready to begin business, there may often be
delays. In such event a qualifying share of stock may stand in
the name of the organizing attorney for substantial periods
of time. In none of the activities indicated is the corporation
actually engaging in business. And the lawYer who handles
the task of determining and directing and participating in
the steps appropriate to transforming the idea into a competent legal entity ready to engage in business is not an alter ego
of the corporation. By his professional acts he has not been
engaging in business in the name of the corporation; he has
been merely practicing law.
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied October
4, 1961.
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